CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS AND STATE
BAR EXAMINATIONS-Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F.

Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
The plaintiffs, James Keenan, Margaret Burnham, and Loren Mitchell, commenced this action to test the validity of R. VI (6) of the
Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in the State of
North Carolina." The Board of Law Examiners was made a party defendant, since it was charged by the North Carolina Legislature with
the responsibility of establishing and enforcing all rules pertaining to
2
the licensing of attorneys.
Each plaintiff is a practicing attorney, having been admitted to at
least one other state bar. Upon request to the Board for permission to
take the North Carolina bar examination, each applicant was refused
on the ground that he failed to comply with the residency requirements
of R. VI (6). Pending its decision, the three judge panel granted the
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the Board
to treat the applications as though there had been full compliance with
R. VI (6). 3 Except for Mitchell, who failed to comply with another unchallenged rule, the examination was administered and each applicant
4
passed.
That portion of R. VI which the plaintiffs sought to have declared
void provides:
Before being certified (licensed) by the Board to practice law in the
State of North Carolina a general applicant shall: . . . (6) Be and
continuously have been a bona fide citizen and resident of the State
of North Carolina for a period of at least twelve (12) months prior
to the date of his bar examination ....
The court assumed jurisdiction of the controversy under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), 2201, 2281, 5 and concluded that the
1 This action was brought under the class action provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
The class consisted of all prospective applicants for the North Carolina Bar Examination
who had not yet been residents of the state for the twelve month period required by
L VI (6). Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24 (Supp. 1969). This enacting section provides in pertinent
part:
For the purpose of examining applicants and providing rules and regulations
for admission to the bar including the issuance of license therefor, there is hereby
created the Board of Law Examiners ....
3 317 F. Supp. at 1352.
4 Id.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964) provides in pertinent part:
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cause of action maintained by the plaintiffs was one based upon a state's
infringement of a federally protected right and therefore within the
scope of Ex parte Young.6 There the Supreme Court held that the federal courts could entertain an action when it was directed against the
state.
The Board of Law Examiners contended that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the decision in Theard v. United
States,7 which held that the federal courts could not review questions of
state disbarment except where constitutional issues were involved. The
court in Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners concluded that it had "jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 to consider claims arising out of the
application by state officials of a general bar admission requirement that
is alleged to be unconstitutional on its face." 8 In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished those issues involving errors in judgment
in applying legislation and those involving alleged unconstitutional
legislation, and found that the instant case fell within the latter category.
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964) provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect
to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree
and shall be reviewable as such.
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964) provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement,
operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer
of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made
by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not
be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
6 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (in a contempt case, the Court held that a suit against a state
official was in reality a suit against the state and therefor cognizable in the federal courts);
accord, Sparrow v. Gill, 304 F. Supp. 86, 89 (M.D.N.C. 1969) (action brought against state
officials by a municipal resident seeking to have part of a state bussing statute declared
unconstitutional).
7 354 U.S. 278 (1957) (Court held that while federal courts had no authority to
review the actions of a state court in disbarring an attorney for personal or professional
misconduct, such restrictions would not apply where the issue involved misconduct
sufficient to disbar an attorney from practicing in federal courts).
8 317 F. Supp. at 1353.
9 Id.
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The Board further argued that the court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this matter and that such abstention would avoid
an unnecessary decision of a serious federal question and alleviate unnecessary federal-state friction. 10 The court, in responding to these
contentions, asserted that the courts of North Carolina had already determined the validity of R. VI (6), although not in this particular action."'
The court further found England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners12 to be dispositive of the issue of abstention:
[T]he abstention doctrine . . .[by][i]ts recognition of the role of
state courts as the final expositors of state law implies no disregard
for the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of
federal law.'3
Having disposed of the jurisdictional issues, the court declared that
R. VI (6) was unconstitutional because it "denies to the plaintiffs ...
equal protection of the laws" and "imposes a burden upon the right
to interstate travel without being necessary to promote a compelling
state interest ....-14 The court perceived that R. VI (6) classified applicants into two categories: (1) those applicants who had been residents
of the state of North Carolina for the required period of time; and (2)
those who had failed to establish such residency. 15 It found that such a
distinction involving the right to become a member of the legal profession denied to the nonresident applicants equal protection guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. 16 The court further held that the rufle
LO Id. at 1356.
11 Id. at 1357. The late Chief Justice R. Hunt Parker of the North Carolina Supreme
Court had painstakingly reviewed the current rules, including R. VI (6), and had approved
their adoption. Also, the Supreme Court of North Carolina had reviewed R. V, superseded
by R. VI (6), in Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E.2d 90 (1954), and held that the
rule did not violate any of the applicant's rights under the North Carolina Constitution.
12 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (Court held that a litigant who is remitted to the state court
under the doctrine of abstention may preserve his right to return to the federal courts for
disposition of his federal contentions).
13 Id. at 415-16.
14 317 F. Supp. at 1362.
15 Id. at 1358.
16 Id. at 1362. It has been generally recognized that the right to practice law in a
state court does not fall within the purview of the privileges and immunities provision
of the fourteenth amendment. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in Ginsburg
v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889, appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 52 (1958), the individual
states are the sole authors of the requirements for legal licensing, and failure to admit applicants to practice law within the state who have not complied with the reasonable requirements of such licensing statutes, is not in contravention of the privileges and immunities provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) recognized this proposition when it stated
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was objectionable because of its over inclusion; while it barred applicants who may have lacked the necessary qualifications (ability and character) it also barred, "arbitrarily and capriciously, applicants who [were]
eminently qualified for admission."1 7 Here the court found support in
Carrington v. Rash,15 where the Supreme Court held that the state's
interest in barring transients from voting (by requiring a residency
waiting period) was a valid exercise of its police power, but the inclusion of all servicemen into such a classification would be over inclusive
and violative of the equal protection clause. 9
The court in Keenan also held that, notwithstanding the failure of
R. VI (6) to meet the equal protection prerequisites, the rule also
"treads upon fundamental personal rights" of interstate travel. 20 As
primary authority for this conclusion, the court cited Shapiro v.
Thompson 2l where, in a case involving a residency requirement for
receipt of welfare by newly arrived residents, the Supreme Court held
that the right to relocate or pass through another state is a fundamental
constitutional right upon which the individual states could not tread,
absent a compelling state interest.22
that the states must be left to select their own bars and establish the necessary qualifica
tions, such regulation being necessary for the protection of their citizens.
The one area where the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment has been applied, in respect to the legal profession, is in the area of federal-state
practice. In State ex tel. The Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S.
379 (1963), the Florida Supreme Court had sustained an order barring the petitioner from
opening an office within the state of Florida for the purpose of practicing patent law
before the United States Patent Court, of which he was a practicing member. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing, held that the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment prevented the state of Florida from excluding a
member of the United States courts from practicing law within its boundaries, when
such practice was limited to those matters solely within the federal court system. See
generally Comment, Fourteenth Amendment, Privileges and Immunities Clause, Civil
Liberties, The Hague Case, 38 MICH. L. REv. 57 (1939); Comment, Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States-Colgate v. Harvey Overruled, 9 Gao. WASH. L. Rzy.
106 (1940).
17 317 F. Supp. at 1360.
Is 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
19 Id. at 96.
20 317 F. Supp. at 1361.
21 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
22 Id. at 634.
We do not doubt that the one-year waiting-period device is well suited to dis-

courage the influx of poor families in need of assistance. An indigent who desires
to migrate, resettle .... and start a new life will doubtless hesitate if he knows
that he must risk making the move without the possibility of falling back on state
welfare assistance during his first year of residence, when his need may be most
acute. But the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State

is constitutionally impermissible.
Id. at 629.
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By its ruling, the court has extended the principles enunciated in
24
23
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners and Konigsberg v. State Bar.
Schware involved the refusal by the state of New Mexico of a license to
practice law, the basis being the applicant's alleged subversive affiliations. Denial of the applicant's petition for licensing was mandated by
the Board of Law Examiners without a hearing in which the applicant
could present evidence and confront the witnesses against him. The
Court, in condemning such action, succinctly stated:
A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or
from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .[The] State can require high standards
of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its
law.., but any qualification must have a rational connection with
the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. 25
The Court further found that, from the record submitted, there was
insufficient evidence to "rationally [justify] a finding that [the appli26
cant] was morally unfit to practice law."1
While Schware evidenced an awareness of the state's obligation
not to act arbitrarily in determining any qualifications, Konigsberg,
decided on the same day, held that an applicant for admission to a state
bar could refuse to give information which the Committee of Bar
Examiners sought, where he had furnished sufficient evidence tending
to prove his good moral character. 27 The petitioner in Konigsberg had
continuously refused to answer any questions concerning his present or
past membership in the Communist Party, and the Court held that
where an applicant for admission to a state bar had demonstrated his
good moral character and the Committee had failed to show any conduct which would adversely reflect upon his character fitness, a finding
of unacceptability could not be based solely upon his silence or upon
28
any adverse inferences drawn therefrom.
353 U.S. 232 (1957).
24 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
25 353 U.S. at 238-39.
26 Id. at 246-47; accord, Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96
(1963) (attorney's right to practice law is a constitutionally protected right and exclusion
for character fitness reasons must be based upon a full and open hearing).
27 353 U.S. 252. But see Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Court, on sub23

sequent appeal, held that refusal by the petitioner to answer material questions having
a substantial relevance to his qualifications would prevent his licensing under California
law); Comment, Character Investigation and Admission to the Bar, 20 U. Prrr. L. REv.
841 (1959); Comment, Admission to the Bar and the Separation of Powers, 7 UTA L.
REv. 82 (1960).
28 Id. at 273: cf. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (failure of applicant to co-
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While Schware and Konigsberg involved the rights of attorneys to
be admitted to the state bar, the main thrust of these decisions was in
the area of due process. Since such issues were not raised, the Court neither inquired into the area of residency, nor did it see fit to establish
general guidelines for the administration of the various state bar requirements. There have been only three reported cases found, all in
New York, where the courts have been confronted with the issue of
residency as it applies to attorneys. 29 In each, there was a distinct failure to either recognize or explore the constitutional issues of equal
protection and the restriction upon free interstate travel. Typical is the
holding in In re Kerno:
Application for admission to the Bar denied . . . [because]

the applicant has failed to furnish satisfactory proof that he is and
has been an actual resident of the State of New York for not less
than six months immediately preceding the making of such application for admission . . .0
Pre-Schwaredecisions have generally held that the right to practice
law was not a property right, and as such, not protected by the fourteenth amendment. 3 1 But with the advent of mid-twentieth century
concern for civil liberties and equal protection guarantees, regardless
operate with the Committee on Character Fitness of the Illinois Bar by refusing to
answer certain questions was sufficient to prevent licensing); Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952) (state employees are protected from arbitrary and discriminatory
exclusion from public employment by the Constitution); Slochower v. Board of Educ.,
350 U.S. 551 (1956) (dismissal of public school teacher without a hearing violated due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889)
(statute requiring physicians to acquire a license was constitutional since its purpose
was to protect the public from unqualified practitioners). But see Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511 (1967), where the Court held that the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Fortas
in his concurring opinion stated:
[A] lawyer is not an employee of the State. He does not have the responsibility
of an employee to account to the State for his actions because he does not perform them as agent of the State. His responsibility to the State is to obey its laws
and the rules of conduct that it has generally laid down as part of its licensing
procedures. The special responsibilities that he assumes as licensee of the State
and officer of the court do not carry with them a diminution, however limited,
of his Fifth Amendment rights.
Id. at 520.
29 In re Meyer, 6 App. Div. 2d 696, 174 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1958); In re Kohl, 5 App. Div. 2d
781, 170 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1958); In re Kerno, 1 App. Div. 2d 972, 151 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1956).
30 1 App. Div. 2d at 973, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
31 See, e.g., Fellner v. Bar Ass'n, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957) (in a disbarment proceeding for violation of Maryland's criminal code, the court held that the right to
practice law was not a constitutional right and therefore not within the purview of the
fourteenth amendment); In re New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 4 Misc. 2d 728, 156 N.Y.S.
2d 651 (1956) (criminal contempt proceeding to enjoin the practice of law in New York
without first acquiring a license).
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of race or residence, 2 at least one jurisdiction enunciated a new philosophy concerning the rights of a professional to employ his skill. The
Supreme Court of Arizona in Application of Levine stated:
[T]here is inherent in our democratic system the right to compete
freely on an equal basis for the material goods of existence and
that the right is protected by the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 33
The court indicated that it was discarding the privilege-right distinction in favor of the concept that the rights of an attorney to practice his
profession were of no less import than those of any other occupation;
these rights must be shared on equal terms by all who seek to earn a
living.8
In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,85 the Supreme Court was
confronted with a state statute involving the regulation of natural gas
production, and Mr. Justice Van Devanter, in the course of the majority opinion, enumerated certain guidelines for the purpose of determining the validity of legislation:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in
that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification
having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because . . . in practice it results in some inequality. 3.
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it,
the existence of that state of facts at the time that the law was en32 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (private agreements which discriminate against blacks regarding housing are violative of the equal protection clause where
state court enforcement is present); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (exclusion,
on the basis of race, from voting in a state primary election where the state either supports or regulates such elections is unconstitutional). See generally Comment, Discrimination Under the Fourteenth Amendment-Expansion of the State Action Concept, 6 VILL.
L. REv. 218 (1960-61); Comment, State Action and the Equal Protection Clause-Status
of Lessee of Public Property, 59 MiCH. L. Rxv. 450 (1961).
33 97 Ariz. 88, 91, 397 P.2d 205, 207 (1965).
34 Id. Many states still distinguish the rights of attorneys on the basis of the privilege-right theory. However, with respect to constitutional issues, such a distinction
would seem to be a mere problem of semantics, As the Supreme Court stated in Schware:
We need not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is a "right"
or "privilege." Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage in
this occupation is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be
prevented from practicing except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of
law is not a matter of the State's grace.
353 U.S. at 239 n.5.
85 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
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acted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such
a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon
any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.3 8
In evaluating the reasonableness of the classification established by
R. VI (6), the court in Keenan considered the three reasons which the
Board of Law Examiners proffered in justifying its continued existence:
(1) An applicant who resides in the state for the requisite period of
time should become familiar with the governmental structure of the
state and his community; (2) The residency requirement gives the community a chance to evaluate the applicant's moral character, and makes
the evaluation of the applicant by the Board easier and much less costly;
(3) When the applicant has resided in the state for one year, it evidences an intent on his part to become a permanent resident.3 7
In responding to these issues, the court first found that there was
"no rational relationship between 'fitness or capacity to practice law' and
a knowledge of 'local custom',"38 such a contention being totally provincial in nature and not in any way related to the upgrading of the state's
bar. The court dismissed the second justification, stating that the only
effective method of evaluating an applicant's moral character, or evaluating his background, was to consider his "life style" in the community
where he has spent the better part of his life. Such an evaluation cannot be validly made upon the basis of a residence for one year. 9 Concerning this issue, it has been said:
Of course the reason given for a period of residence prior to admission is that it will thus prevent an unknown lawyer of bad
moral or professional character from gaining admission, because
during this period he will have an opportunity to establish his
36 Id.
at 78-79. For cases involving regulation of business, see Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (sustaining New York City ordinance which
prohibited the operation of vehicles carrying advertising); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141
(1940) (sustaining a state antitrust statute which exempted combinations of agricultural
producers); Bordens Farm Prod. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936) (sustaining differential between advertised and unadvertised milk). But see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457
(1957) (invalidating a state statute which required all businesses engaged in selling money
orders to submit to state licensing requirements except American Express). See generally
Dykstra, Legislative Favoritism Before the Courts, 27 IND. L.J. 38 (1951).
For cases on taxation, see Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 US.
495 (1937) (sustaining a tax on employers of eight or more for unemployment compensation); Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898) (sustaining a tax differential on inheritance based upon relationship and amount). See generally Sholley, Equal
Protection in Tax Legislation, 24 VA. L. REV. 229 (1938); Comment, Taxing the Chain
Stores, 12 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 75 (1937).
87 317 F. Supp. at 1359.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1360.
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good moral character where he will be under the observation of
local people. Practically this is of little or no protection to the state
and the bar. A mere year of residence does not go far to establish
a man's character and only careful investigation at the applicant's
former place of residence is apt to disclose those habits or qualities
40
which would make him an undesirable member of the local bar.
While investigating an applicant's out of state credentials might be expensive, the court reasoned that this factor might be alleviated by the
use of the highly "efficient, thorough, and widely used nationwide investigatory service operated by the National Conference of Bar Examiners."' 4 1 Notwithstanding such a service, as was intimated in Carrington, mere administrative inconvenience is insufficient justification for
42
an arbitrary, over inclusive regulatory classification.
The court failed to consider the Board's third contention, apparently finding no sound basis in law for such a justification. Moreover,
Schware would seem to be dispositive of this issue, since it is difficult
to conceive of a situation wherein permanent residence could rationally
reflect upon one's legal ability. The court felt that this justification was
merely a subterfuge to protect resident attorneys from outside competition. An analogous situation arose in Mercer v. Hemmings, 43 where
the Supreme Court of Florida held that the two year residency requirement for the state's accountancy examination was unjustified in light of
the goal to be achieved:
The regulation of the profession of accounting is an exercise of
the police power, for the benefit and protection of the public and
isnot intended as economic protection for the profession from
prospective competitors. Little, if any, reason can be found for requiring a certified public accountant of another state to cease his
profession, close his office, and bask in the Florida sunshine for a
period of two years before taking the examination. Successful and
worthy persons in other states, the kind of citizens we want in
from ever becomFlorida, are from a practical standpoint banned
44
ing Florida Certified Public Accountants.
40 Horack, "Trade Barriers" to Bar Admissions, 28 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 102, 103 (1944).
See also Comment, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1711
(1967); Comment, Restrictions on Admission to the Bar: By-Product of Federalism, 98
PENN. L. REv. 710 (1950).
41 317 F. Supp. at 1360. The Board had contended that the necessary delay, administrative paperwork, and inconvenience would be unduly expensive if it had to investigate the applicant's out of state credentials.
42 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1915) (prohibition against voting by army personnel declared
unconstitutional); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
43 194 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1967).
44 Id. at 583-84 (emphasis added).
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Although there is no provision in the Constitution which expressly
guarantees the right of interstate travel, it has been generally conceded
that such right is established by either the commerce clause4 5 or the
privileges and immunities clause 46 of the fourteenth amendment. Irrespective of which theory is applied, the right to be free from oppressive
restrictions to interstate travel has been a fundamental concept. As Mr.
Justice Stewart stated in United States v. Guest,
[the] right [of interstate travel] finds no explicit mention in the
Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so
elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In
any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long
been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.4 7
It seems evident that gauged against this pronouncement, R. VI (6) is
an unnecessary barrier to the right of relocation into the state of North
Carolina.
Keenan will probably be severely limited to its own peculiar fact
situation in the future. Considering the diversity of state residency requirements, 4 8 it is difficult to speculate under what set of circumstances
a residency requirement will be found violative of the constitutional
guarantees of equal protection and free interstate travel. But Keenan
has established some guidelines by which rules similar to R. VI (6) may
be judged. While it is true that these standards are not explicitly summarized, it has by its negative implications destroyed for all time three
of the most inconsistent and irrational arguments asserted in defense
45 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (invalidating California statute
making it a misdemeanor for anyone to knowingly bring or help bring into the state
a nonresident indigent person); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849) (invalidating
tax on each passenger of a foreign ship or from a sister state to defray expenses in inspecting for disease).
46 See, e.g., Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871) (invalidating a tax placed
upon all merchandise sold within the state and not manufactured there); Crandall v. Nevada,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (invalidating tax on all personal travel, both into and out of
the state).
47 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) (concurring opinion) (indictment of private citizens for
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 for conspiring to deprive certain black citizens of the use
of interstate roads).
48 No Residency Requirement: District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, and Louisiana;
Resident at the Time of Application: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin; One to Six Months Residency: Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
and Wyoming; Seven Months to One Year Residency: Georgia, Hawaii, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and West Virginia; Must be a Registered Voter: Indiana; Must be Domiciled
within the State: New Jersey.
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of such requirements: knowledge of local custom and government; public scrutiny and ease of evaluation; and encouragement of permanent
residency. The court has evaluated the ambitious motives given for the
adoption of such rules and found that they do not adequately further a
valid state interest in abridging a nonresident's rights.
Perhaps the most noteworthy contribution of Keenan is the severing of the bonds which have held an attorney to one geographical area.
Under the present system, an attorney is precluded from moving into
another jurisdiction to practice without enduring extreme economic
hardship. He must wait an often burdensome period to take the bar examination; wait for the results to be published; place himself at the disposal of the state supreme court for the "swearing in" ceremony; and,
until he has paid these "dues," he cannot be permitted to practice his
profession. There is no temporary license for which he can apply, and
working as a "law clerk" for an established firm will only bring him a
small percentage of the income he formerly earned. It is small reward
for the many years of professional training he has endured and an unnecessary burden on his right to earn a living. Keenan, it is hoped, will
rectify this injustice.

49

Jon J. Auty
49 At press time, it would appear that Keenan is having this anticipated effect.
Georgia's one year residency requirement was recently struck down by a three judge
panel in Webster v. Wofford, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ga., No. 14253, Dec. 31, 1970); Mississippi's one year residency requirement is under attack in Lipman v. Mississippi Board
of Bar Admissions, (N.D. Miss., filed Dec. 22, 1970).

